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                                              ABSTRACT  
The term anti-Americanism has become common in public and academic debate in the 
last decade. Yet we have only limited knowledge of those who hold such views. From 
2003, 2005 and 2006 Eurobarometer data, almost 20% of EU respondents disapproved 
of USA policy in all five dimensions the surveys examined. Following the literature, 
this consistent opposition is defined as anti-American. Anti-Americans exhibit 
systematic differences in age, education, geographical location, policy preferences and 
nationality.  In addition although anti-Americanism is associated with a preference for 
greater European independence, perhaps surprisingly it is also linked to a desire for a 
less federal and hence less powerful Europe. In both sets of attitudes, to the USA and to 
the EU, there is also a strong regional dimension within countries, which reinforces the 
view that it is too simplistic to describe a country as being anti-American or being pro 
European integration. 
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                          Who is anti-American in the European Union? 
 
‘....in Europe, there has been an anti-Americanism that at once can be casual but also            
insidious.’ Barak Obama speaking in Strasburg, April 2009.  
 
 
                                                  Introduction  
After the election of President G W Bush and especially after 9/11, it seemed to some 
that the United States (USA) adopted radically changed attitudes to its allies and to its 
enemies. Allies were to be led, not accommodated; alliances were temporary and 
purpose-specific. Enemies might be preemptively attacked, their regimes changed, and 
if possible democratized in an American approved style. The USA exhibited a new 
isolationism of perspective along with a wider, more vigorous projection of its power 
(Iwama, 2004).  
 
Unsurprisingly this apparent major change created a European crisis of trust, which is 
now discussed openly by politicians, commentators, and scholars. We want to examine 
some solid data that could help us determine the strength of European citizens` views of 
the USA at this apparent point of change, and to allow an analysis of their different 
dimensions, and the characteristics of those who held them. In particular we want to 
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explore whether opposition to USA policies was accompanied by a desire for a more 
integrated and powerful EU, one that might become a countervailing economic and 
political power to USA influence. This leads us to try to link – at least empirically – two 
hitherto separate literatures: that on anti-Americanism with that on attitudes towards EU 
integration. 
 
The data are drawn from three Eurobarometer surveys for the European Commission: 
those of March-April 2003; October-November 2005 and September-October 2006. The 
2006 survey is the most recent available that includes the 2003 survey`s questions on 
EU respondents` attitudes to USA policy. For the 2003 survey, during whose collection 
period the Iraq War began, some 23,000 citizens in the then 15-member union were 
questioned, using face-to-face home interviews in their national language. In the 2005 
and 2006 surveys almost 27,000 citizens in the now 27-country EU were surveyed1. The 
sample frame was those aged fifteen and above, but we wanted to study the views of 
those who could influence policy - that is voters - so we analyze respondents aged 
eighteen and over.  The surveys’ multi-stage random probability design ensures a 
representative sample with respect to metropolitan, urban and rural areas. For each 
interviewee, the data included age, sex, educational level, income and nationality, plus 
some attitudinal variables. 
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We focus on the EU electors` answers to two sets of questions: 
1) Whether the respondent felt the USA played a positive, negative, or neither a positive 
nor negative role in a) the search for world peace; b) the fight against terrorism; c) the 
fight against world poverty; d) the protection of the world environment; and e) world 
economic growth. We are not so much interested in the responses to any one question, 
but in the totality of such responses. In particular building on Berman (2004) we define 
an anti-American mindset as one which consistently disapproves of USA policies across 
a range of different policy dimensions.  
2)Whether the respondent felt that independent EU defense, security, and foreign 
policies were desirable; and possible links between these views and respondents` views 
on USA foreign policy. 
 
We aim to answer three basic questions. (1) Is there clear evidence of the existence of 
anti-Americanism? (2) Is anti-Americanism random or is it linked to certain personal 
characteristics; for example nationality, or residence in a particular region of a country? 
(3) Do those with anti-American views also share an identifiably similar set of opinions 
on either the foreign or security policies of the EU or its future political development? 
  
Section 2 of this paper discusses the definition of anti-Americanism and surveys the 
literature. It also reviews the literature on voters` attitudes to European Integration. 
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Section 3 provides the justification for the model of attitude determination that underlies 
the empirics. Section 4 gives the results, and section 5 summarizes our conclusions. 
      
         
                                                     Literature Review 
  
Here we define anti-Americanism, and review the existing literature on its extent and 
causes. 
Defining anti-Americanism 
This term has been widely and loosely used. What is needed is a definition that 
corresponds to observable phenomena. For example Spiro (1988: 120) defines anti-
Americanism as ‘a persistent pattern of gross criticism of the main values of the US 
Constitution.’ This is both too vague: the values need to be defined; and too specific. 
For example why is it confined to the Constitution?   
 
Alternatively Krastev (2004: 6-7) defines anti-Americanism as ‘opposing any policy 
simply because it is endorsed by the US government’. This is not a good choice of 
definition, both because it is a causal definition: it includes the cause of the 
phenomenon under investigation, and because operationally it relies on a probably hard 
to distinguish preference distinction. 
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Berman (2004) provides a more tractable definition that focuses on opposition to 
specific American policies, or groups of policies. This leaves the motivation for the 
opposition open for investigation. It also allows a search for clusters of opposition, 
across policies, countries or respondents without prejudging their cause. Such a 
definition is value neutral, and it is possible to test for its presence.  
 
We think it is worth extending the range of opinions that are used to assess the pattern 
of anti-Americanism, by including policy effects as well as policies. We also narrow our 
focus onto those who hold consistently negative views of USA policies or of their 
effects. We extend the range to both policies and policy effects, because it is not clear 
that respondents distinguish between them, and Eurobarometer questions involve both. 
We confine our description of anti-American to those who have consistently negative 
views in all five of the examined USA policy dimensions, because we want to explore 
links with their views on the EU. Opposition to an individual policy could arise for a 
myriad of reasons, and have little or no linkage to common concepts of anti-
Americanism. In addition if there is nothing unusual in our narrowly defined anti-
American group`s pattern of views on the EU, then in the survey data there are likely to 
be few interesting links between the wider group of European voters` views of the USA 
and their views on the future of the EU.      
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 The Literature on Attitudes towards the USA and its Policies 
Opinion poll evidence for European anti-American views in the early years of this 
century, summarized by Linn (2004), revealed a growing negative view of the USA, 
though with marked differences across European states, and more positive views in 
recent EU members. Kohut (2003: 1-2) quotes a 2001 State Department survey ‘where 
78% of Germans said they had a favorable view of the U.S. That fell to 61% in our 
(Pew Research Center) 2002 poll – and to 45% in the survey conducted (in spring 
2003). Opinion of the U.S. in France has followed a similar track: 62% positive in 
1999-2000, 63% (in 2002)…and 43% (in 2003).’   
 
But according to both Linn and Kohut although EU public opinion has changed the US-
EU ‘value divide’ is not widening. Linn (2004: 13) defines ‘basic values’ as ‘views 
regarding fundamental, life and death issues that are embedded in traditional culture and 
do not vary quickly or significantly over time.’ Such values might be the roles of the 
individual and the state; belief in God; or the necessary conditions for a just war. These 
he contrasts with  ‘“public opinion” (which although it) refers to views and perceptions 
mainly on matters of current politics or events…’ can and generally does ‘also cover 
and reflect basic values’ (ibid.). These authors believe that the recent growth in anti-
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Americanism reflects changing European public opinion rather than a basic value 
change. 
 
But even if there has been no profound change in European values, some American 
commentators have taken a very combative line. For example Ceaser (2003) claims that 
anti-Americanism in Europe influenced Islamic terrorists. He traces anti-Americanism 
back to the eighteenth century biological degeneracy thesis that all species, including 
human beings, thrived less well in the New World. By the late eighteenth century this 
then dominant view also appeared in a political variant that asserted the inferiority of 
the American political system because it was not grounded in tradition. For Ceaser 
(2003: 16) anti-Americanism ‘…is a construct of European thought…anti-Americanism 
makes rational discussion impossible, it threatens the idea of a community of interests 
between Europe and America. Indeed it threatens the idea of the West itself.’ 
 
One does not have to accept Ceaser`s extreme account to agree that the USA`s power, 
and hence its pervasive influence, has created the preconditions for distrust of its 
motives. The US response to 9/11, and especially the invasion of Iraq, produced 
widespread European opposition. The more radical criticism went beyond policy 
disagreement and purported to examine alleged flaws in the American psyche that led to 
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the violent and intimidating behavior that, some argued, has marked America since its 
inception (Sardar and Davies, 2002, 2004). 
 
A common view in the literature argues that attitudes to the USA are strongly 
influenced by views of American leaders and what they do, but also by views of the 
American people (Chiozza, 2009:283). A related view claims that non-Americans can 
and do distinguish between ‘what America is’ and ‘what America does’ (Keohane and 
Katzenstein, 2007: 2). The latter argue that because America encompasses a very wide 
range of values and life styles it provides foreigners with many reasons for attraction 
and repulsion. This helps explains the phenomenon of those who may oppose its foreign 
policy but still wish to work there.  
 
The degree of distrust of America varies across European countries, most plausibly 
because of past contacts. However opinions are constantly evolving. Germany and 
France provide two examples. Although relatively pro-American, Germans have 
recently become more distrustful. Berman (2004: 29-30)  claims ‘…there is a specific 
German continuity from pre-1989 Communist anti-Americanism to post-Communist 
anti-Americanism, which has been particularly relevant, given the role of the former 
Communist Party – the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) – and its ability to 
influence the larger German political landscape.’ Other influences he cites are the 
 11 
 
‘…association of Americans with ‘capitalism in a negative sense’; a ‘…pre-democratic 
anti-Americanism (that) finds expression in contempt for aspects of American mass 
culture’, and a post-democratic anti-Americanism…driven by resentment that the 
United States has been unwilling to cede sovereignty to the structures of international 
governance.’  
 
But French opinion is arguably the most anti-American. Meunier (2005:126) argues that 
‘…France is the country with the deepest, most sedimented reservoir of Anti-American 
arguments.’  Toinet (1988), a French commentator sympathetic to the USA, argued that 
after its critical help to the US in the War of Independence, France looked in vain for a 
‘special relationship’ with the new state. Instead relations were punctuated by 
intermittent tensions. For example France interpreted the 1898 American attack on the 
Spanish empire in the Caribbean and the Philippines as a threat to all European empires. 
The US did not forgive France its First World War debts. Roosevelt initially favored 
Vichy over the Free French, and wanted a retributive postwar military government for 
France. But even such an unpromising legacy cannot explain the severity of some 
criticisms. Toinet`s explanation is that French commentators see a clash between the 
ideals of French civilization and American advocacy of its view of democracy. For the 
commentators, American democracy has led to and entails an unacceptably rapacious 
and uncaring form of capitalism (Todd, 2003; Grunberg, 2005). 
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The Literature on Citizens` Attitudes to European Integration 
Haas (1958) argued that supporting greater EU integration involved a cost-benefit 
calculation; a view empirically supported by Gabel (1998) and Sanchez-Cuenca (2000). 
There are two common reasons why people might wish power transferred to the EU 
from member states. First, if there are economies of scale, economies of cost, or 
externalities in implementing policy, it may be more efficient to operate the policy at an 
EU level. Second, EU and national redistribution policies may differ, and some voters 
may favor the EU policy in preference to their national policy. 
     
Kritzinger (2003) presents an alternative view emphasizing the political, economic, 
cultural and historical contexts in which attitudes developed. The key role of national 
concerns in European parliamentary elections supports this hypothesis (Franklin et al., 
1995). Lacking specific EU knowledge, voters use their evaluations of domestic politics 
(Anderson, 1998). Much of their general EU information is also filtered through 
national politicians. Garry and Tilley (2009) also argue that apart from a cost-benefit 
calculation, attitudes are influenced by national identity. But there is little agreement on 
the nature of this influence. Carey (2002) linked a strong sense of national identity with 
anti-integration views. Haesly (2001) finds the opposite. Garry and Tilley (2009) 
reconcile these conclusions by arguing that its impact depends upon the country’s 
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situation, e.g. with respect to income per capita. In passing we note that their control 
variables included age; sex; employment status and education level, finding support for 
the EU to be associated with being relatively highly educated; middle class; male; and 
satisfied with the domestic economic performance.  
 
Ordinary citizens may link their views of national and EU politics in one of two 
opposed ways. The ‘equal assessments’ hypothesis suggests that people interpret both 
from similar viewpoints, perhaps because national politicians also participate at inter-
governmental meetings (Anderson, 1998). A counter perspective sees national and EU 
politics as alternatives, even rivals: those disillusioned with one may see the other as a 
more attractive way forward. Using 1994 Eurobarometer data Kritzinger (2003:237) 
concluded that `The EU is used as a proxy for symbolic protest against the present 
national political and economic situation`.  
 
 
                                           Attitude Determination  
Respondents` Attitudes towards USA policies 
Because anti-Americanism, the key variable that we analyze, is binary we use probit 
regression. The literature review showed that there has been only limited empirical 
research into anti-Americanism; much of it focusing on differences between countries 
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rather than on individuals within countries. The novelties in this paper are that it 
provides the first large-sample regression models using multi-country individual citizen 
data; and that it includes the first empirical analysis that explores a possible link 
between EU citizens` opinions on US policies and their opinions on EU integration. 
 
The primary independent variables of interest are those relating to the country fixed 
effects, the regional variables and the individual’s policy preference variables. We focus 
on four policy issues: terror, the economy, defense and the environment, using a simple 
measure that reflects whether the individual thought they were important. These are 
included because for example individuals` attitudes to US policies may in part depend 
upon the relative importance they place on the environment as compared to terrorism as 
policy issues. Country specific attitudes will differ and again memory will be relevant, 
although this time it is likely to be the collective memory of a nation that, as noted 
above, determines attitudes to the USA. Within a country there may be regional 
differences in attitudes, perhaps linked in part to the presence of American military 
bases or US multinationals in particular regions. 
 
Following common practice in analyzing political attitudes our control variables include 
the socio-economic variables of age; education; sex; occupation; a measure of the 
respondent`s household income relative to their country`s average household income; 
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and a variable that reflects respondents` trust in big business. Not all these variables are 
available for all three surveys.  
 
The variables are defined in the Appendix. A brief rationale for their inclusion is as 
follows. 
The literature survey indicated that views of USA policy or its effects may be 
influenced by respondents views of the USA`s government, people, culture, power, and 
social and economic systems. Attitudes towards these factors have changed over time 
and location. Attitudes may be partly influenced by knowledge, including personal 
experience. To some extent they may be related to social norms and hence reference 
groups, conventional wisdom, and even irrational bias. In turn these influences can 
sometimes be linked to the independent variables used here.   
 
For example educated people may be more aware of issues such as the violation of 
human rights in Abu Ghraib, or climate change, which in turn could fuel a blanket 
opposition to US policies. Variables such as age, sex and education may be related to 
direct experience of American culture, including music, films or fast food outlets that 
may be factors influencing respondents` attitudes to America. Age may also be relevant 
in providing a direct memory of periods such as the Cold War and the Second World 
War2 when American power was often viewed more favorably than in the Bush era. 
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Location can also influence exposure to American culture: for example exposure to fast 
food outlets or US multinationals is more likely in large cities than rural areas.   
 
Respondents` Attitudes to European Integration 
The focus is on policies with international spillovers; defense related foreign policy and 
also the EU constitution. We follow Hass (1958) and others and assume those who 
favor greater European integration feel that they will benefit from it – individually or 
altruistically, or both. Their views are uninfluenced by the appropriate service delivery 
level (Oates, 1999), because this is a given. International influence and defense 
capability increase with economic size. Hence a united EU voice has more impact than 
any single member country, and possibly more than the sum of all members. But 
integration also entails a loss of sovereignty and a country may become committed to 
support and finance policies it opposes. 
 
Individual differences towards EU integration will thus arguably largely depend upon 
how the individual perceives the national interest and the extent to which they are 
willing to trade national sovereignty for a greater global role. Such attitudes are likely to 
be driven by national pride and identity, and therefore we include the socio-economic 
factors that are standard in this type of analysis as well as country-fixed effects. But as 
with our analysis of EU citizens` views of USA policy, and similar studies of Central 
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and Eastern European attitudes to the EU and to NATO (Caplanova et al., 2004), we 
include regional variables, in this case to pick up any effects of localized EU 
investment. 
    
In addition we also include attitudes to the USA. There are two possibilities. The first 
and most obvious is that anti-Americanism will drive European integration. This is 
consistent with an analysis of the institutional choices of EU constitutional delegates in 
the area of EU foreign policy (Jensen et al., 2007). They found that delegates from 
states that had not deployed troops in support of the US-led Iraq invasion were more 
likely to support EU integration. Their explanation was that such states would be more 
interested in creating a European foreign policy capable of counterbalancing the USA 
because they are more opposed to US policy. But with individual citizens` attitudes 
there is also the reverse possibility: that people are opposing a superpower and will not 
want to see a second superpower grow from the nations of Europe, even though, or 
perhaps especially as, they will be part of that superpower. 
 
                                                      Data and Analysis  
We have already described the Eurobarometer sample frame and interview procedures. 
Our probit regressions use the survey`s attitudinal and characteristics data to explore 
their inter linkages. The variables are defined in the appendix. The key variable is, of 
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course, the one relating to anti-Americanism, and it is measured by sustained opposition 
to American policies across five dimensions of policies: peace, terrorism, poverty, the 
environment, and world growth.  
 
Attitudes to the EU are measured in relation to voter support for a greater co-ordination 
of defense policy, foreign policy, an EU military rapid reaction force, a common crisis 
response position and greater independence of foreign policy from the USA. In the two 
recent surveys, data on the last three were not available, but there was information on 
support for an EU constitution. The constitution apart, these are predominantly foreign 
policy and defense issues that could be addressed by inter-state agreements. Hence 
greater EU co-ordination implies a reduction in national sovereignty. Of course to an 
extent this is also the case for the EU constitution. In our analysis of the 2003 survey, 
the individuals` incomes were approximated by the mid point of the income range in 
which the survey placed them. Their relative income was calculated as the ratio of this 
approximation to the country average. In the later surveys data on income was not 
reported, but data on life satisfaction and in the 2005 survey on individual personal 
circumstances in the recent past were available and were used.  
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
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4.1 Voters` views on US policies 
Table 1 reports attitudinal variables. The first column in the top half of Table 1 records 
the proportion classified as anti-American in 2003, i.e. disapproving of US policy with 
respect to all five policy areas of peace, terror, poverty, environment and growth. The 
alternatives include positive views and respondents with neither positive nor negative 
feelings. The proportions are quite high, and much higher than would be the case if 
views were randomly distributed between alternatives across the different issues. Thus 
in France in the 2003 sample, randomly distributed attitudes would lead to 9.6%3 
disapproving of US policy on all five dimensions, not the 34.7% we see, and in the UK 
we would have seen less than 0.1% defined as anti-American not 9.2%.  
 
There are also considerable differences between countries for (2003; 2005; 2006). At 
the one extreme we have France (34.7%; 28.1%; 27.4%), Spain (33.2%; 36.3%; 30.0%) 
and in particular Greece (68.0%; 64.1%; 62.9%) with a very high proportion of people 
classified as consistently disapproving of American policies. At the other extreme 
Denmark (7.5%; 8.0%; 9.7%) and Sweden (10.2%; 8.2%; 10.4%) have only small 
minorities classified as anti-American. But across the three years an average of seven 
EU15 countries had more than 20% of respondents holding negative views on all five 
issues.  
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The bottom half of the table also extends the number of countries to the EU27 for 
(2005; 2006). The new member countries except for Cyprus (45.0%; 53.3%) and 
Slovenia (29.7%; 21.9%), are much less critical of the US than ‘old Europe’.    
 
Insert table 2 about here 
 
Table 2 reports the 2006 distribution of the population disagreeing with US policies in 
terms of the number of issues. Ordering the distribution in this way reveals the wide 
range of approval or disapproval patterns across countries. Greece and Cyprus again 
stand out as having high levels of disagreement with the US on all issues and the East 
European countries and Malta as having very low levels of disagreement. Ireland and 
Italy have high levels of zero disagreements, but a growing number of multiple 
disagreements. France, Germany, Finland, Belgium and Luxembourg have few who are 
strongly supportive, but large numbers who are unsupportive on multiple issues. 
Austria, the UK, Spain, Portugal, and Slovenia show varying degrees of polarized 
disagreement patterns, with 0 and 5 disagreements the two modes. Spain and Portugal 
are strikingly polarized. Sweden exhibits the opposite pattern, with 2 as the mode; and 
the Netherlands views are almost equally distributed across the categories. 
 
Insert table 3 about here 
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Table 3 gives the regression results for attitudes to US policies. The use of squares of 
ages allows different age cohorts to have different reactions, perhaps reflecting the 
history of US involvement in Europe. Note that because of the variation in some 
questions across the three surveys, replication of results cannot always be tested.  
 
Table 3 shows  
1. In 2005 and 2006 age has a non-linear impact, significant at the 1% level, which 
indicates that consistent opposition to American policies first increases and then 
declines with age. Based on equations 2 and 4 from the Table, in 2006 and 2005 the 
turning points are 50 and 48 years respectively.  
2. In 2005 and 2006 more educated people were significantly more hostile than less 
educated people.  
3. In 2003, as income increased hostility to American policies declined. In 2005 and 
2006 people who were dissatisfied with their life and whose personal situation had 
recently deteriorated tended to be more hostile to American policies. 
4. People who lived in villages and rural areas tended to be less hostile to US policies 
than those who lived in small towns, who again were less hostile than those who lived 
in cities. 
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Both the income and age impacts might have been expected, with richer voters and 
those with memories from the height of the cold-war more supportive towards the USA. 
The USA`s association with capitalism may attract the wealthy.  
 
Attitudinal variables are significant along several dimensions. Concern with terrorism 
tends to increase broad support for USA policies. The environment is also a key issue of 
increasing salience, with those who felt the environment to be important disapproving 
of American policies. But even more than the environment, attitude to big business is a 
defining issue. In the two years for which we have data, mistrust of big business is 
highly significant in increasing disapproval for American policies. Apart from 
individual preferences and characteristics, people are also influenced by factors specific 
to their region. When anti-Americanism in the region is high this tends to influence an 
individual`s views. This suggests either that people are influenced by those around 
them, or that there are specific factors relevant to a region.  
 
The country coefficients reflect differences in attitudes compared to a base country - 
here Finland. The choice of Finland has no substantive impact on the results. Choosing 
a different country would have altered the size of the country dummy coefficients, but 
not their relative ordering. These country fixed effects are not shown in the tables, but 
Figure 1 reflects their average values from the regressions in columns 1 and 3 of Table 
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34. Hence, given all other variables, it reflects an attitude to the USA which 
characterizes the country as a whole. Of the EU15 the least favorable to the USA are 
Greece, Spain, Luxembourg and France. Sweden and Denmark are more favorable. In 
general the new entrants are more favorable to the USA with the exception of Slovenia 
and Cyprus. But it is clear on this that ‘new Europe’ is less disapproving of the USA 
than ‘old Europe’. The difference between France and the UK narrowed throughout the 
three years, with both countries showing some convergence. Nonetheless, based on the 
third regression from the Table, for a ‘representative individual’5 the probability of 
being opposed to US policies on all five issues is 0.18 in the UK and over 50% greater 
at 0.28 in France. In Greece and Lithuania the probabilities are 0.64 and 0.04 
respectively. 
  
Insert Figure 1 about here 
   
Insert Table 4 about here. 
 
Voters` views of EU policies 
Table 1 also shows basic data on respondents` attitudes towards EU policies. 
Specifically it shows the proportion who approved of greater EU integration or co-
operation out of all those surveyed, including ‘don’t knows’. In 2003 a large majority of 
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respondents in all EU countries favored foreign policy independence from the USA. 
Other foreign and defense issues follow a similar pattern. The only exception was UK 
respondents` views on a more coordinated foreign policy, with slightly less than half of 
those questioned in favor. This general pattern of support was largely repeated in 2005 
and 2006 even amongst the new EU entrants. 
 
In Table 4, we focus on the relationship between respondents` attitudes to the USA and 
their support for European integration. In the 2003 sample regressions, the binary 
variable, ‘anti-American’, reflecting negative attitudes along the five dimensions of 
support for the USA, is significant. That is, those classified as anti-American are more 
likely to support an EU foreign policy more independent of the USA’s. They are 
however less likely to support EU defense policy co-ordination and also foreign policy 
co-ordination, the creation of a rapid reaction force and holding common positions in 
the face of crises6.  
 
Turning to the other variables, support for greater EU independence from the USA 
increased with the level of education, and was higher for men. Men were also more 
favorable to an expanded EU role in foreign and defense issues, including a rapid 
reaction force. Country dummies (not shown) suggest that Denmark and Finland were 
the most hostile to the force, with Greece and Spain being the most favorable. 
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Responses reflect both attitudes to integration and willingness to project military force. 
On the individual policy preferences, concern with the economy tended to be associated 
with support for a stronger EU, as was to a lesser extent environmental concern. Finally, 
mistrust of national governments and also big business was linked to reduced support 
for a stronger EU.  
 
In the 2005 and 2006 samples there were questions on attitudes to defense and foreign 
policy but not on the other issues. However, there was an additional question on the EU 
constitution. The results were largely consistent with those for 2003 with respect to the 
impact of anti-Americanism. They were also similar with respect to education and 
attitudes to the economy.  In addition those whose personal situation had deteriorated 
tended to be more hostile to a strengthening European union. Distrust of big business 
also tended to reduce support for EU integration. Finally again there were significant 
regional impacts: where there were high levels of mistrust of the EU, the individual was 
also less likely to be favorable to EU integration7. This could again be due to peer group 
influence or to specific factors unique to the region such as EU regional aid. However in 
a region characterized by high levels of anti-Americanism, individuals were more likely 
to exhibit positive views on issues relating to EU integration, especially on the 
constitution. This slightly compensates for the reverse impact of individual views. 
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                                                              Conclusions 
We defined anti-Americanism as consistent opposition to USA policy, and focused our 
study on those EU voters who took a negative view of that policy in all of the five 
dimensions covered in the Eurobarometer surveys. Our three questions were: (i) Is there 
clear evidence of the existence of anti-Americanism in the EU electorate? (ii) Is anti-
Americanism random or is it linked to certain personal characteristics? (iii) Do those 
who consistently disapprove of US policies also share an identifiably similar set of 
opinions on the foreign policy or future political development of the EU?    
 
Our results show strong evidence of anti-Americanism linked to age, education, policy 
preferences, national origin, and in particular mistrust of big business. The latter 
strongly suggests that a root cause of anti-American attitudes is anti-capitalism. If so the 
financial crisis and recession of 2007-10 is unlikely to increase support for the USA, 
notwithstanding the considerably greater popularity of President Obama outside 
America, compared to that of his predecessor. 
 
In ‘old Europe’ anti-Americanism is less common in the UK8, Italy, Ireland and 
Sweden. Greece, France and Spain stand out in having consistently more unfavorable 
attitudes. As we noted this pattern is consistent with these countries historical 
experiences. However, attitudes to the USA are in general considerably more positive in 
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‘new’ than in ‘old Europe’. EU expansion does appear to have made its members, at 
least on average, less hostile to USA policy.  
 
Excepting Ireland, this pattern of country support also matched explicit initial support 
for the Iraq war. It may also have adversely affected American multinationals and US 
exports (Anholt and Hildreth, 2004). The lesson is that a ‘hard power’ victory can come 
at the expense of a ‘soft-power’ defeat (Nye, 2004).  
 
European hostility to America also has implications for the EU. We showed that EU 
voter anti-Americanism leads to a demand for less dependence on the US, though not 
for an EU to rival America. Indeed the reverse is the case – disapproval of American 
policies was not linked to a desire for greater European defense and foreign policy 
integration, nor for an EU constitution. In the main, EU voters who feel American 
policies have been bad for the world do not want a more powerful EU. Finally it is 
important to stress that there are important differences within the regions of countries 
and between urban and rural areas. Therefore it can be an oversimplification to label a 
country as being pro-EU integration or anti-American policy: some regions are, some 
are not.  
 
 28 
 
The conclusions we have reached provide an extensive and nuanced answer to the 
question in our title “Who is anti-American in the European Union”. We relied on large 
scale and repeated surveys of public opinion. But it is worth recalling an important 
limitation of this type of analysis. The data does not allow us to distinguish opinion 
from distrust or indeed bias and prejudice. That limitation can be important if the views 
we have recorded influence EU or EU member states` policy. The obvious extension to 
our research would be to explore the impact of European anti-Americanism on 
European policy and relations with the USA.   
   
 
                                                                Notes 
 
We are grateful to Alice Leonard and to Roger Eatwell for comments and suggestions. 
 
1. As well as a small number in potential EU countries that we do not analyze. 
2. Memories of both periods may vary across EU countries. 
3. There are several ways of calculating expected anti-Americanism that 
incorporate the assumption that each outcome is equally probable. For example the 
quoted figure for France is based on the assumption that the 72.9%, 48.3%, 53.9%, 
73.4% and 69% who had negative views on USA policy with respect to peace, terror, 
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growth, the environment and poverty were distributed randomly across the population, 
with individual views not being correlated across policies. 
4. These relate to 2005 and 2006, the two years for which we have a full 
complement of countries. 
5. Defined here as a forty year old town based woman with a university degree, 
who is fairly satisfied with her life and whose personal situation has improved. 
6. It seems unlikely that endogeneity – for example, that respondents` attitudes to 
greater coordination of EU defence policies contribute to their disapproval of American 
policies – will be a problem. But to test this hunch we included an independent variable 
representing respondents` mistrust of the EU, in regressions where the dependent 
variable was anti-Americanism – as in Table 3. In 2005 and 2006 at the regional level 
mistrust of the EU had strongly impacted on respondents` attitudes to EU policies. So if 
attitudes to EU policy integration do impact on anti-Americanism, this variable should 
be significant. In fact in none of the regressions was this true, even at the 20% level of 
significance. 
7. Trust in the EU was not included for the individual as it is too closely related to 
the independent variable, rather than being a causal factor impacting on it. A measure of 
life satisfaction was also excluded because of a potential endogeneity issue if 
dissatisfaction with EU integration decreased individual wellbeing. Its inclusion had 
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little impact on other variables though there was evidence that greater dissatisfaction 
reduced support for integration. 
8. Although evidence suggests it has been increasing in the UK, particularly since 
2003.  
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APPENDIX: DATA DEFINITIONS 
Individual Independent Variables: 
Male:  female=0, male=1. 
Age: Respondent`s age in years. 
Village/Town: Coded 1 if the individual lived in a village or rural area/ town, otherwise 
zero. 
Education Age an individual finished full time education.  Coded: 1 for <16 years; 2 
for 16-19 years; 3 for >19 years.   
Self-employed, unemployed, house person, manual worker Coded 1 if the 
respondent fell into any of these categories; otherwise zero. 
Household income relative to country average Measured by the ratio of household 
income to average income in a respondent's country. Income data uses a twelve-point 
scale. Its proxy was the mid point of the range corresponding to the scale point. 
Attitudes to Terror, the economy, defense and the environment: a question that 
asked for the two most important issues then facing the country; from a choice of 
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twenty four. Coded 1 if mentioned and zero otherwise. Used as independent variables in 
the regressions. 
Trust in big companies and also in the national government. Coded 1 for no trust, 
and zero for trust or do not know. 
Personal Situation: coded 1 if the individual believed their personal situation had 
improved over the previous five years; 2 if it was unchanged; and 3 if it had worsened. 
Life satisfaction: Coded from 1 (very satisfied) to 4 (not at all satisfied). 
 
Attitudes to US Policy 
Anti-American A binary variable taking a value of one when negative responses were 
given to all five questions on attitudes to the USA. These were in response to the 
question ‘In your opinion would you say that the United States tends to play a positive 
role, a negative role or neither a positive nor negative role regarding ....’ The questions 
covered (i) world peace; (ii) the fight against terrorism; (iii) the fight against world 
poverty; (iv) protecting the world environment and (v) growth of the world economy. 
 
Attitudes to EU Policy: 
Independent of USA Responses to the question ‘The European Union already has a 
Common Security and Foreign Policy and a European Security and Defense Policy. 
There is now a debate about how much further these should be developed. Do you tend 
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to agree or disagree with each of the following statements? European Union foreign 
policy should be independent of United States Foreign Policy’. Coded 0 (tend to 
disagree), 1 (don’t know) and 2 (tend to agree). 
Defense and Foreign Policies Responses to questions on whether the EU should have 
common defense and foreign policies. Coded 0 for against, 1 for don’t know,  and 2 for 
in favour. 
International Crisis Responses to a question on whether in a crisis the EU member 
states should have common position. Coded as above. 
Military Reaction Force (MRF) Response to a question on whether the EU should 
have a military rapid reaction force for international crises. Coded as above. 
European Constitution Whether the respondent favored a constitution for the 
European Union; Coded as above. 
 
Regional Variables:  
Averages calculated for education; for trust in the EU and for the anti-American 
variable for the region the individual lives in. The average excludes the individual. In 
2006 the EU had 334 regions, ranging from just one for Malta to 28 for Bulgaria, 21 for 
France and 17 for Spain. In 2005 there had been 328 regions, with unchanged numbers 
for most countries, but fewer regions for Bulgaria. In 2003, with a smaller number of 
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EU members there had been only 194 regions, but again with unchanged numbers for 
most countries.    
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Table 1: Attitudes to US and European Integration 
 
2003     EU Policies: 
 Anti- Foreign   Defense   MRF International Independent   
 American Policy Policy   Crisis of USA    
Austria  28.2 66.5  62.0  56.4  75.0  77.0     
Belgium 26.4 73.8  80.6  75.2  85.4  75.0     
Denmark 7.5            55.3  57.7  53.9  80.3  75.5     
Finland 14.9 56.1  51.8  50.8  76.4  88.5     
France 34.7 68.8  77.3  76.4  87.1  79.1     
Germany 19.2 76.7  80.4  58.4  85.3  84.2     
Greece  68.0 81.9  84.7  75.2  85.9  88.0     
Ireland  13.1 61.3  51.7  60.8  72.7  74.5     
Italy  16.7 78.7  86.4  72.4  87.9  74.5     
Luxembourg  21.0 85.2  93.1  71.2  93.8  80.3     
Netherlands  13.6 69.9  78.1  68.6  83.3  76.0     
Portugal  23.6 63.2  74.8  69.4  76.5  68.9     
Spain  33.2 70.3  77.0  69.4  78.6  75.0     
Sweden  10.2 55.7  55.5  67.3  83.6  87.1     
UK  9.2 40.9  50.0  70.2  72.9  67.4     
2005  EU Policies:           2006  EU Policies: 
   Anti- Foreign   Defense  Consti-  Anti- Foreign   Defense Consti-                     
  American Policy Policy tution  American Policy Policy     tution 
Austria  22.0 63.6  62.7  49.0    19.3  63.4  62.6   51.5  
Belgium  30.4 62.0  70.5  61.5    38.6  57.8  67.2   61.3  
Denmark  8.04 60.3  69.3  45.4     9.7  61.6  68.8   46.3  
Finland  20.1 59.2  60.5  47.5   18.9  60.8  61.8   53.1  
France  28.1  71.4  82.4  66.9   27.4  69.6  81.2   64.6  
Germany  18.5  79.0  87.3  74.2   17.9  78.1  84.7   73.6  
Greece  64.1  74.0  77.7  68.2   62.9  80.0  82.2   72.1  
Ireland  14.5  58.8  57.3  57.5   18.4  58.9  51.9   57.3  
Italy  15.5  71.7  77.0  72.8   15.6  70.3  76.0   69.8  
Luxembourg 21.8  72.0  86.3  69.0   31.0  73.8  86.0   70.8  
Netherlands 14.0  69.9  82.1  63.0   17.8  69.1  78.7   58.3  
Portugal 23.6  56.2  66.6  57.9   29.9  55.1  63.5   55.1  
Spain 36.3  63.3  69.3  61.2   30.0  64.0  68.5   60.1  
Sweden   8.2  54.9  62.5  44.5   10.4  53.0  57.3   45.4  
UK 17.6 49.8  58.3  46.5   19.0  49.5  57.8   43.3  
Bulgaria   7.5 69.8  77.6  65.2     8.8  70.0  76.2   63.9  
Cyprus  45.0 80.7  87.8  73.1   55.3  76.7  86.9   73.0  
Czech R.   4.9 68.9  87.3  49.1     5.2  67.1  85.8   55.3  
Estonia    5.0 69.8  81.6  47.2     5.3  66.7  79.8   52.8  
Hungary   9.8 72.4  82.3  75.3      10.9  71.9  80.0   73.0  
Latvia   6.5 72.7  87.3  56.0     5.8  72.2  85.9   57.2  
Lithuania   3.3 70.6  81.7  63.5     2.9  70.3  81.9   65.9  
Malta   6.6 50.2  56.8  56.0     7.4  51.2  59.8   57.0  
Poland   5.3 74.9  83.6  58.7     4.3  77.3  83.2   62.8  
Romania    3.9 70.8  75.4  69.8     4.7  69.9  75.5   67.0  
Slovakia    9.7 72.3  87.4  64.1     9.6  74.1  85.7   66.1  
Slovenia  29.7 76.8  84.3  73.5   21.9  79.4  84.8   77.7  
For each year figures in the first column show the percentage classified as anti-American, i.e. disapprove of 
American policy on all five issues; and in the second and subsequent columns, those in favor of greater European 
co-operation or independence from the USA on various issues. 
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 Table 2: Percentage Disagreeing with (0 to 5) US Policies in 2006   
  0 1 2 3 4 5 
Austria  21.46 13.58 15.55 15.94 14.17 19.29 
Belgium 10.37 11.17 12.96 19.64 23.63 22.23 
Bulgaria 51.50 15.65 11.11   7.73   5.22   8.79 
Cyprus 11.33   5.17   5.57 10.14 12.52 55.27 
Czech 49.40 16.87 14.30   8.80   5.41   5.22 
Denmark 16.75 19.64 19.84 16.55 17.55   9.67 
Estonia 42.20 19.80 17.10 11.10   4.50   5.30 
Finland 13.60 12.50 16.80 17.90 20.30 18.90 
France 10.33 10.63 13.31 16.39 21.95 27.41 
Germany 10.23 11.22 13.48 20.87 25.84 18.36 
Greece   6.60   2.90   6.30 10.40 10.90 62.90 
Hungary 38.81 16.82 13.23 13.03   7.16 10.95 
Ireland 31.40   9.30 15.60 12.90 12.40 18.40 
Italy 39.46 11.53 12.13 11.23 10.04 15.61 
Latvia 44.24 20.00 16.85   8.18   4.93   5.81 
Lithuania 63.80 14.00 10.70   5.50   3.10   2.90 
Luxembourg 15.20 10.40 13.00 15.20 15.20 31.00 
Malta 53.60 14.40 11.40   6.60   6.60   7.40 
Netherlands 13.95 16.80 17.68 16.50 17.29 17.78 
Poland 47.30 17.90 17.00   7.60   5.90   4.30 
Portugal 30.55   7.64 13.07   9.65   9.15 29.95 
Romania  64.85 13.47   7.93   5.54   3.53   4.68 
Slovakia 36.85 16.13 17.11 13.10   7.23   9.58 
Slovenia 19.40 11.54 17.26 15.62 14.26 21.92 
Spain 38.68   5.48   7.48   9.57   8.77 30.01 
Sweden 13.62 15.50 21.22 19.84 19.45 10.37 
UK 20.71 16.79 14.53 14.67 13.97 19.34 
Source: Calculated from the Eurobarometer survey, September-October 2006  
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Table 3: Regression Analysis: Attitudes to the US: 
 
Variable  2006    2005       2003 
       
Age  0.0116**   0.011**   0.0108**  0.0078*   0.0063    0.005 
  (3.56)   (3.34)   (3.18)   (2,28)   (1.30)    (1.01) 
Age2 -0.0116** -0.0109**  -0.0113** -0.009*  -0.006   -0.0045 
  (3.56)   (3.32)   (3.31)   (2.46)   (1.14)    (0.89) 
Male  0.0278   0.030     0.0184  -0.0208  -0.0574   -0.0632* 
  (1.35)   (1.44)   (0.87)   (0.97)   (1.91)    (2.07) 
Village -0.0969** -0.0803**  -0.1143** -0.0797** -0.0284   -0.0199 
  (3.78)   (3.02)   (4.35)   (2.86)   (0.75)    (0.50) 
Town -0.0540*  -0.0418  -0.0693*  -0.0320   0.0196    0.0072 
  (2.10)   (1.58)   (2.18)   (1.17)   (0.55)    (0.19) 
Education  0.0774**   0.0726**  0.0613**  0.0489** -0.0012   -0.0147 
   (5.01)   (4.63)   (3.87)   (3.01)   (0.05)    (0.62) 
Self- -0.0558  -0.0552   0.0091   0.0110   0.1231*    0.1279* 
employed  (1.43)   (1.39)   (0.22)   (0.26)   (2.17)    (2.22) 
House -0.0435  -0.0226  -0.077*  -0.0527*  -0.0054    0.0135 
Person  (1.17)   (0.61)   (2.07)   (1.39)   (0.10)    (0.25) 
Un-  0.0337  0.0376   0.0249  -0.0315   0.073    0.0736 
employed  (0.79)   (0.87)   (0.56)   (0.70)  (1.17)    (1.17) 
Manual -0.0178  -0.0198  -0.0151  -0.0152   0.0021    0.0057 
Worker  (0.64)   (0.07)   (0.54)   (0.54)   (0.05)    (0.15) 
Income             -0.0991** -0.0706* 
              (3.22)  (2.26) 
Life satis-  0.1089**   0.105**   0.0677**  0.0401**   
faction  (7.51)   (7.16)   (4.51)   (2.62)   
Personal         0.0875**  0.0784**   
situation         (6.15)   (5.41)   
Policy Issues 
Terror    -0.1572**    -0.0813*      -0.1528** 
     (4.24)      (2.10)         (3.11) 
Economy     0.0067     -0.0274         0.0092 
     (0.28)      (1.13)           (0.26) 
Defense    -0.0478     -0.0186         0.1098 
     (0.73)      (0.24)           (1.74) 
Environment     0.180**        0.136*          0.073 
     (3.82)        (2.55)           (1.05) 
Trust big           0.3275**        0.2986** 
Business            (15.30)         (10.02) 
Regional 
Education    -0.0798     -0.073        0.0343 
     (1.21)      (1.02)         (0.35) 
Anti     2.371**        2.223**       2.602** 
American     (19.11)        (17.63)       (15.32) 
Constant -1.448**   -1.729**  -1.370**  -2.081**  -1.073**  -1.684** 
  (13.94)   (9.34)    (13.02)   (10.68)   (7.77)    (6.16) 
Observations     25656  25656  25234  25234      10755       10755 
Log likelihood.  -10467  -10263  -10126  -9814      -5110       -4924 
Χ2       2976    3384    3027   3651    1143  1518 
Notes: (.) denotes t statistics. **/* denotes significance at the 1% and 5% levels of significance.  
Equations estimated by probit in STATA. Country fixed effects included. Χ2 denotes the  
likelihood ratio statistic. The policy issues relate to respondents` concerns with these topics as issues, and  
so differ from their perceptions of the USA on similar policy areas (see the data appendix). 
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Table 4: Regression Analysis: Attitudes to European Integration 
                             2006                                                         2005                                               2003 
Variable    Foreign Defense Constitution Foreign Defense      Constitution  Foreign  Defense  Military Re-   Crisis      Independent 
     Policy policy  Policy Policy  Policy Policy   action force   position  of USA 
Age  0.0114** 0.0046 -0.0019  0.0172** 0.0136**  0.0079** 0.0064  -0.0011  -0.0144* 0.0078 0.0012 
  (4.40)  (1.66)  (0.77)  (6.37)  (4.63)  (3.05)  (1.52) (0.25)  (3.40)  (1.62)  (0.25) 
Age2 -0.0116** -0.0077** -0.0012 -0.0161** -0.016** -0.0087** -0.0042 0.0018 0.0136** -0.0059  -0.0008 
  (4.49)  (2.77)  (0.48)  (5.95)  (5.37)  (3.34) (0.96)  (0.41)  (3.44)  (1.19)  (0.16) 
Male  0.116**  0.118**  0.0948**  0.1395**  0.1380** 0.0808** 0.1187** 0.0911** 0.162** 0.1603** 0.0741* 
  (6.84)  (6.48)  (5.82)  (8.11)  (7.34)  (4.93)  (4.53) (3.34)  (6.26)  (5.35)  (2.53) 
Village -0.0467* -0.0109 -0.0055 -0.0147 -0.0088 -0.0501* 0.0792* 0.0868* 0.1099** 0.1774** 0.0247 
  (2.18)  (0.48)  (0.27)  (0.66)  (0.37)  (2.35)  (2.31)  (2.42)  (3.26)  (4.59)  (0.66) 
Town -0.0337 -0.0028 -0.0131  0.0582**  0.0709**  0.0184 0.0542 0.0315 0.1317** 0.1483** 0.0179 
  (1.57)  (0.12)  (0.64)  (2.63)  (2.95)  (0.87)  (1.71) (0.96)  (4.23)  (4.17)  (0.51) 
Education  0.1504**  0.1567**  0.149**  0.1505**  0.1452**  0.1256** 0.100** 0.081** 0.0112   0.0289 0.1124** 
  (11.77)  (11.47)  (12.10)  (11,46)  (10.23)  (10.02)  (4.85) (3.80)  (0.55)  (1.22)  (4.91) 
Self-   0.0708*  0.0765*   0.0611  0.007  -0.0086 -0.0228 -0.0662 -0.0523  -0.0823 -0.0999 -0.0679 
employed  (2.11)  (2.12)  (1.91)  (0.19)  (0.23)  (0.70)  (1.26) (0.95)  (1.61)  (1.70)  (1.16) 
House -0.0692*  -0.0421 -0.101** -0.0359 -0.0548 -0.0363 -0.0401 -0.0796  0.0325 0.0789 -0.0724 
Person  (2.31)  (1.32)  (3.46)  (1.18)  (1.68)  (1.23)  (0.85) (1.61)  (0.69)  (1.45)  (1.44) 
Un- -0.0501 -0.0766* -0.0603 -0.0525 -0.0956* -0.0254 -0.094 -0.0414  -0.1349*  0.0085 -0.0151 
employed  (1.45)  (2.06)  (1.80)  (1.49)  (2.48)  (0.75)  (1.75) (0.74)  (2.54)  (0.14)  (0.25) 
Manual -0.0334  -0.0431 -0.044*  -0.104** -0.0610* -0.0713** -0.0696* -0.034  -0.0031 -0.0053 -0.069 
Worker  (1.49)  (1.78)  (2.03)  (4.62)  (2.46)  (3.31) (2.07)  (0.98)  (0.09)  (0.14)  (1.85) 
Income       0.110** 0.110** 0.0840** 0.145** 0.1385** 
        (4.17) (4.01)  (3.19)  (4.76)  (4.56) 
Personal    -0.1013** -0.1050** -0.1142**      
situation     (9.05)  (8.58)  (10.68)      
Trust   -0.238** -0.2485** -0.3026** -0.201** -0.163** -0.252**  -0.131** -0.1035** -0.0968** -0.0701* -0.022 
Government  (14.06)  (13.68)  (18.52)  (11.09)  (8.25)  (14.52)  (4.92)  (3.73)  (3.69)  (2.30)  (0.74) 
Trust big    -0.0898** -0.0753** -0.0923** 0.0011   -0.0539 -0.0325 -0.0051 0.113** 
Business     (5.12)  (3.93)  (5.52)  (0.04)  (1.94)  (1.24)  (0.17)  (3.83) 
Anti -0.1167** -0.1726** -0.124** -0.112** -0.1533** -0.0783** -0.1607** -0.2264** -0.2752** -0.2342** 0.2369** 
American  (5.14)  (7.24)  (5.66)  (4.82)  (6.20)  (3.50)  (4.94) (6.72)  (8.71)  (6.50)  (6.24) 
Policy Issues 
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Terror  0.0664* 0.0811**   0.0719*   0.1157** 0.0998** 0.0938** 0.0241  0.1232** 0.132** -0.0557 -0.1006* 
  (2.24) (2.57)  (2.51)  (3.72) (2.99) (3.15)  (0.59)  (2.85)  (3.19) (1.22) (2.36) 
Economy -0.0234 -0.0255  0.0263 0.1026** 0.1084** 0.0948** 0.1698** 0.1246** 0.0373 0.1459** 0.1732** 
  (1.19)  (1.20)  (1.39) (5.19) (4.96) (5.04) (5.40) (3.81)  (1.24)  (4.02)  (4.89) 
Defense   0.0726 -0.0879  0.1127* 0.0753 -0.0461 0.0501 0.0699 0.1384* -0.0257 -0.0091 -0.0352 
   (1.31)  (1.55)  (2.11) (1.17)  (0.69)  (0.82)  (1.29) (2.44)  (0.48)  (0.15)  (0.60) 
Environment   0.115** 0.0465  0.1673** 0.0331 -0.1257** 0.1206* -0.1169 0.0143 -0.1536** 0.043 0.1387 
   (2.78)  (1.07)  (4.16) (0.72)  (2.65)  (2.72)  (0.28) (0.23)  (2.61)  (0.61)  (1.95) 
Regional 
Education  -0.0491 0.0398 0.1713** 0.2159** 0.1453* 0.0367 0.0219 0.0175 -0.0976 -0.1588 0.2459* 
   (0.90)  (0.69) (3.30) (3.60) (2.25)  (0.63) (0.25)  (0.19) (1.14)  (1.57)  (2.51) 
Anti  0.4155** 0.401** 0.2626* 0.0119 -0.1114 0.2862* 0.231 -0.0079 -0.2899 0.161 0.319 
American  (3.58) (3.29) (2.35) (0.63) (0.90) (2.54) (1.41)  (0.05)  (1.81)  (0.87)  (1.74) 
Trust EU -0.6727** -0.819** -0.6098** -0.3271** -0.3978** -0.393** -0.5071** -0.225  0.0517 -0.0371 -0.4237* 
  (6.24)  (7.25)  (5.88)  (3.13)  (3.55)  (3.90)  (3.14)  (1.32)  (0.33)  (0.20)  (2.37) 
Observations      26776 25776 25776 25331 25331 25331 10775 10755 10775 10755 10755 
Log likelihood.    -20942      -17582      -22928 -20274 -16420 -22619    -8655 -7865 -8970 -6120 -6592 
Χ2       1458         2242         2123  1667 2429 2244     871     1251  697      410    480 
Notes: (.) denotes t statistics. **/* denotes significance at the 1% and 5% levels. Equations estimated by ordered probit in STATA. Country fixed effects were  
included. Χ2 denotes the likelihood ratio statistic. The policy issues relate to people’s concerns with these topics as issues, and so differ from their perceptions of the US  
on similar policy areas (see the data appendix).  
 
 
 
 45 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: This reflects the average of the country fixed effects in the regressions in Table 3 from columns  
1 and 3. They have been normalized to a lower bound of 0.  
 
 
 
